Introduction
The integration of control & safety in process automation is still a controversial topic, but the benefits in terms of reduced capital expenditure and operating costs are increasingly driving process industry end-users down the path toward considering integrated systems. Most mainstream DCS vendors now have an integrated control & safety offering, and acceptance of such technology within the process industry is growing. This is particularly evident in the upstream and midstream oil & gas sector. The refining, petrochemical and chemical industries seem inherently more conservative and here the take-up of an integrated approach is slower, but it is gathering both pace & momentum.
This technical paper discusses the benefits that can be realised in the context of typical integration scenarios and looks at the challenges of integrating control & safety systems whilst still complying fully with functional safety standards such as IEC 61508 & IEC 61511.
In order to better understand what is actually meant by integrated control and safety it is important to understand some of the terminology used in functional safety standards to describe the systems used. The process sector functional safety standard IEC 61511 uses the term Basic Process Control System (BPCS) as a generic term to describe what we commonly think of as a DCS or PLC based regulatory control system. The term Safety Instrumented System (SIS) describes an instrumented system used to implement one or more Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs). As its name implies the SIS encompasses all elements within the SIF i.e. sensors, logic solvers and actuators. The Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS) approach seeks to combine the functionality of both in a single overall system architecture -typically from a single vendor.
Cynics might say that ICSS, as a concept, came about because DCS vendors saw an opportunity to "muscle in" on the safety system market. It has been something of a battleground between specialist SIS vendors and DCS vendors ever since the release of the first truly integrated control & safety systems back in the late 90s. Since then more than a little fear, uncertainty, doubt and controversy have surrounded the issue of Integrated Control and Safety -a situation which, arguably, has been exacerbated by those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. This ongoing controversy combined with the understandably conservative attitudes of safety system users, a lack of understanding over what ICSS actually comprises and legitimate concerns over the issues raised by integration, has served to moderate the growth of the ICSS market somewhat but growth has still been strong. For many end-users the purported benefits of integration are compelling, especially as they can be realised throughout the lifecycle of a plant. Savings of around 30% over the lifecycle have being reported so it is not hard to see why end-users, already accustomed to integrating process control, maintenance management, electrical, communications and security systems, would also seek to integrate the safety systems. Integrated control and safety offers the promise of reducing both the overall lifecycle costs and the capital cost associated with a project. Even though safety systems are generally thought not to contribute directly to return on net assets (RONA), if they can be made easier to configure, maintain and interface to the BPCS whilst, at the same time, lowering spurious trip rates then this can certainly contribute to operating efficiencies. It is not surprising that plant operators would find any such savings attractive as long as safety is not compromised.
System Integration Benefits

Reduced Project Capital Expenditure (Capex)
The cost of the project can be lowered by streamlined interfaces, common databases, reduced engineering, reduced hardware, reduced spares, reduced data mapping requirements and reduced training requirements. The overall complexity of the project can also arguably be reduced by combining scope and using a MAC approach since, if the control and safety systems are in the same overall scope, then the risk of "finger pointing" between vendors in the event of problems is reduced along with the communication overhead during project execution.
In addition to cost savings, integration gives the possibility of using better integrated tools which in turn can help reduce the possibility of systematic errors. Such tools can straddle the divide between control & safety, auto-generating code for safety systems whilst creating "cause & effect" style operator interfaces for the operator without the need for manual data mapping and custom design of graphics. Integrated tools can also help to manage subsequent change on the plant. The automation afforded by these tools reduces engineering time and reduces the risk of systematic faults being introduced, which in turn contributes to making safety system verification and validation easier.
Reduced Operational Expenditure (Opex)
Alarm floods and operator error have often been contributing factors in high profile process incidents. Appropriate alarm management combined with a single window for the operator can give better visibility of the process. Integrated alarm and event logs, with consistent time stamping, are more easily achieved. The ease of displaying appropriate and consistent information to the operator may also contribute toward increased safety.
Some end-user benefits also accrue from simplified maintenance, better asset management tools and integrated system diagnostics. The inclusion of the SIS assets within overall asset management capability of the BPCS helps with preventative and predictive maintenance and can potentially contribute to safety. Smart transmitters can provide a wealth of information which can not only give an indication of the current health of the device but can also predict problems. Techniques such as Partial stroke testing can be fully integrated into the system.
Easier Management of Change
Integrated toolsets and a single database can also make it easier and quicker to manage changes to the safety system logic in accordance with IEC 61511.
Concerns
Separation
The IEC61511 standard states that the BPCS and the SIS shall be designed to be separate and independent to the extent that the functional integrity of the SIS is not compromised (IEC61511-1 clause 11.2.4). The overall safety concept of a plant is typically built up in a series of independent protection layers (IPL) with the BPCS and the SIS each considered to be protection layers (see Figure  1 ). If we want to take credit for the BPCS as a separate layer of protection then it must meet certain criteria. It must be reliable, specific, independent, dependable and auditable. Up until relatively recently the SIS world was very much independent of the BPCS so separation and independence were prima facie self evident. By integrating we bring the worlds of control and safety closer together so clear separation is less obviously self evident and relies on separation being "designed in" rather than coming as a result of diversity of supplier.
Integration may involve commonality of toolsets and hardware so vendors of integrated systems have to ensure that the dividing line between BPCS & SIS functionality is still very evident to engineers, operators and maintenance staff. Prior to IEC61508 many functional safety standards made physical separation of control and safety a requirement. IEC 61508 & IEC61511, being less prescriptive and more performance oriented, leave room for an interpretation which allows for logical separation and not necessarily physical separation. At a fundamental level integrated control and safety systems are still certified to IEC 61508 and are therefore still able to satisfy the standards in regard to separation. In addition they must be designed to help address human factor issues which may cause a blurring of the dividing line.
Common cause, common mode and dependent failure
IEC 61511-1 clause 9.5 addresses the requirements for preventing common cause, common mode and dependent failure. The concern is that a common stressor could adversely affect both the BPCS and the SIS thus causing them both to fail. This could be a physical factor such as an over-temperature affecting common components, or possibly a systematic failure brought about by software shared by both systems.
A single vendor approach for both BPCS & ICSS potentially makes it easier for common cause issues to be introduced but, of course, vendors are aware of this and, driven by the standards, seek to eliminate common cause effects using a variety of techniques. Certification of systems to IEC61508 again gives some assurance in this regard. Of course common cause effects can creep in during project engineering and configuration too and this needs to be addressed during project execution.
One size fits all?
Another argument used to protect the status quo is that the requirements of a BPCS and a SIS are fundamentally different and that, by going down an ICSS route you somehow end up with a "jack of all trades, master of none". Whilst it is true that the requirements are different, ICSS vendors would argue that the differing requirements have been taken into account during the design of the ICSS. This is often reflected directly in the hardware, e.g. the requirements for fail safe SIL certified I/O in terms of line monitoring and diagnostics are sufficiently different from standard I/O requirements as to require specialised failsafe I/O modules for use in the SIS.
SIL requirements imposed on the BPCS
Another area of concern often voiced is that integrating control and safety will necessitate engineering the DCS in accordance with the highest SIL level requirement of the SIS and that this will apply across the whole system during both project execution and maintenance and modification. Clearly if this were true it would negate the benefits of integrating in the first place. The logical separation required to meet the requirements for independence would require adequate separation of the engineering activity with appropriate access protection and a clear dividing line between BPCS & SIS activities.
Cyber Security
Another issue that must be addressed is that of system security. Often control & safety processors are connected to a single redundant network, so great care must be taken to ensure a robust approach to system security is employed, in addition to the measures used to guarantee functional separation. The recent example of the Stuxnet worm, a zero-day exploit of a vulnerability in the Microsoft operating system in an attempt to infiltrate a control system, shows just how sophisticated such malware is getting and has dramatically increased Attacks on computer networks are amongst the biggest emerging threats to the UK, the government has said in its new National Security Strategy (NSS): "A Strong Britain in An Age of Uncertainty." Clearly such threats need to be taken very seriously indeed and need to be addressed appropriately -regardless of system architectures.
We must also ensure that any vulnerability which can cause a basic process control system controller to fail does not also compromise the associated safety system.
We need to protect against:
• Making unauthorised configuration changes to the safety system controller from the Engineering Station; • Manipulating safety system inputs, outputs and internal parameters such as trip points; and • Interfering with the HMI's ability to accurately represent the status of the SIS -e.g. The loss of alarms, "spoofing" the operator or total loss of visibility.
The primary objective is to stop the intrusion happening at all but, where there is a high level integration of control and safety, it is vitally important that there is sufficient diversity and protection between control and safety to ensure that a successful intrusion into the BPCS doesn't similarly affect the SIS. There should be no common cause failure mode and a layered approach based on defence in depth should be used.
Integrated Control and Safety
The demand for integrated systems has increased dramatically over the last few years and so has the number of vendors with an integrated offering. Not surprising vendors have each addressed the challenges of integration in different ways with varying degrees of hardware commonality and diverse architectures.
Some of the concerns previously listed are often founded on ill-conceived notions of just what comprises integrated control and safety. Because of the different approaches used it is particularly important, when looking at the issues surrounding Integrated Control & Safety, to establish exactly what is meant by "integration" in the context of particular system architecture.
ICSS Architectures
Safety Instrumented Systems have traditionally been physically separate from the BPCS, either with no connection or, alternatively, interfaced via a gateway. In the past these systems would typically have been supplied by specialist companies. The newer, less prescriptive safety standards such as IEC61508 allow for the possibility of safety and control combined in an ICSS, typically supplied by just one vendor. The standards still require that there should be separation to ensure that safety and non safety functions are independent of each other and that the failure of a non safety-related function must not cause a dangerous failure of a safety-related function. This is increasingly being interpreted by many vendors as functional separation, either at controller level, or even within a single controller. Achieving functional separation and addressing the concerns about common mode failures are the key challenges that must be tackled with an ICSS approach.
The ARC group defines four terms which can be useful in describing the various different levels of integration. (Figure 2) Separate -The BPCS and the SIS are totally separate and work independently of each other. Separation and independence are more self evident and easier to demonstrate.
Interfaced -This is the traditional approach where the BPCS and the SIS utilise different control & I/O hardware (typically from different suppliers) and are connected together by a gateway for exchange of data. The two systems use separate engineering tools and dedicated operator interfaces. One purported advantage of this approach is the reduction in common cause failure modes, but it comes with higher costs for hardware and installation, higher engineering and maintenance costs, additional training, as well as gateway issues.
Integrated -The process control system and safety system have separate dedicated control & I/O hardware, but typically, are from a single supplier, share a common ancestry and therefore common networks, engineering tools and operator interface. This approach has the advantage of reduced costs for hardware and installation, reduced engineering and maintenance costs, less training, no gateway issues and fewer spare parts. However integration potentially reduces system access control and the reduced use of diverse technology may impact on the system's resistance to common cause failures.
Common -The process control system and safety system are from a single supplier and are on a common platform combined into a single system. They use common control and I/O hardware as well as engineering tools and operator interface. Standard and safety-related programmes are executed in parallel but independent of each other. This approach offers lower hardware costs and the need for fewer spare parts. However, given the reduction in layers a higher false trip rate can be experienced together with increased potential for common cause failure. Management of change issues can occur as well as facing increased system complexity and an even greater reduction of system access control. With BPCS and SIS in the same processor it becomes much more difficult to justify taking credit for both as separate IPLs which increase the SIL requirements for SIFs. 
Integrated Architectures vs. Common Architectures
To be defined as a true ICSS the system will be either Integrated or Common and, not surprisingly, it is with these two architectures that the traditionalists have most problems.
Of these the less contentious is Integrated. The reassurance of being able to physically segregate SIS functionality in its own dedicated cabinet, appropriately labelled and access controlled, is very attractive as it helps alleviate concerns over changes being made to the BPCS also affecting the SIS. In a typical process plant the BPCS can be subject to frequent changes in order to optimise the process. Typically a SIS is modified very infrequently. The integrated approach helps allay concerns that a misplaced modification to the BPCS might inadvertently affect the SIS.
For many process end-users the prospect of a Common approach is just a step too far. Vendors supporting a Common architecture will have typically designed the system from the outset to work in this way and will have the necessary tools to ensure that appropriate logical segregation takes place but, despite these systems gaining all the necessary TUV approvals, the majority of process users still prefer to "play it safe" and go for a physical separation at this level.
The stated benefits of integrated control & safety apply, for the most part, to both the Integrated and the Common architectures. Using the Common architecture may lead to an additional saving in hardware cost but this may well be offset by concerns over taking risk reduction credit for the BPCS which may in turn lead to an increased SIL requirement for the SIS. The Common architecture is often used for certain applications -i.e. OEM scenarios such as control of rotating equipment -where there is a tightly defined, well understood application, which is unlikely to be the subject of ongoing changes. So, even if the Common approach is possible with a particular vendor's system, an ICSS is most often realised by using the Integrated approach described above.
Techniques used to achieve integrated control & safety
There are many different techniques used to achieve the appropriate level of separation, resistance to common cause faults, access protection and security. These include the following:
Access protection
The safety programme is password protected to restrict access to appropriate personnel.
Communications
Safety data writes -certified mechanisms for writing data to the SIS (for overrides etc) Memory protection.
Communication to a safety related device employs safety-certified protocols, such as PROFIsafe, to provide extra assurance that there are no errors in communication. (Figure 3) 
Data integrity checking
Data passed between blocks within a controller or between controllers or from the operator system is subject to extra integrity checks.
Diversity
Diverse hardware i.e. specific failsafe I/O modules with extra diagnostics such as line monitoring Some systems employ hardware diversity at the logic solver level, some have hardware commonality but address common mode failures using additional techniques.
Programme flow checking
For the SIS additional safety programme compilers are used employing hardware watchdogs and programme flow checking methods to ensure correct execution.
Certified software building blocks
Generally the logic that needs to be applied in a safety system is relatively simple so, even though the same basic languages might be used, a specialised TÜV certified library of certified function would most likely be required for safety code. This is likely to be compiled by a separate compiler Separate additional compiler for safety programmes Providing software diversity and adding programme flow checking.
A Safety mode
Locking down the safety programme preventing any changes to the structure.
Safety Islands
Breaking a system down into "safety islands" is one such technique where each of these islands contains measures to detect and control faults at the hardware level and at the safety function level. This prevents interference from the standard elements of the system on the safety function. The certification of the system will take into account its use in an integrated environment and will categorise standard system components that can be run alongside the SIS in a non-interfering manner. It is always advisable when using certified equipment to take a look at the certificate and the report to the certificate to ensure there are no restrictions that could affect its proposed use.
Conclusion
Integrated Control & Safety can bring significant benefits but, of course, it is in everyone's interest that this must not be achieved at the expense of safety.
The current functional safety standards advocate a performance orientated approach where engineers think through their approach to engineering a safety system rather than simply following a prescriptive approach based on what has gone before. Where there are significant benefits in adopting new techniques and technologies, not just in cost but also potentially in terms of safety, then they should be examined, considered and, if fit for purpose, adopted.
End-users considering ICSS would be well advised to consider systems which were designed from the outset to provide the necessary functional separation and which effectively address issues such as common cause, security and cyber-security. TÜV certification is important in this regard.
Consideration should also be given as to how the ICSS helps maintain and re-enforce the concepts of separation through the realisation, operation and maintenance cycles of the lifecycle and how it helps to reduce the risk of human error in this context.
Once satisfied on the safety front end-users should look for other functionality -such as integrated lifecycle tools, safety fieldbus capability and intelligent asset management -to make the best use of the integration opportunities afforded.
Integrated control and safety continues to grow in market share but the rate of uptake will ultimately continue to be determined by the degree of integration that end-users feel comfortable with.
Safety fieldbus is the next technology to seriously challenge the more conservative end-users and again there are parallels to the overall integration debate. The use of a safety fieldbus was ruled out by many of the older, more prescriptive standards used in the world of process safety but again the newer performance based standards have opened the door to this approach. The machinery safety world has long used safety fieldbuses but now the prospect of being able to connect process instruments on a safety fieldbus is a reality. The PROFIsafe PA protocol already provides a SIL 3 capable instrument fieldbus and the Foundation Fieldbus (FF) initiative, FF SIF is not that far behind with trials in place and instruments expected in 2011. 
